




The impact of the Draft "Convention on the Law of the Sea" on the existing
law of the sea would be incalculable if it were to be ratified in its present or a
modified form by all negotiating powers. But if one or more significantly affected
powers were to refuse to become parties to the Convention, the legal situation
would become more obscure than it was before the negotiations began.
II
MAY A NONPARTY CLAIM A LEGAL RIGHT
TO DEEP SEA RESOURCES?
The adoption of the Convention Text on April 30, 1982, marks a milestone in
the development of the international law governing the globe's maritime spaces. It
produced the blueprint for a further limitation on and restriction of the principle
of the "freedom of the seas," which upon its announcement in 16091 served as the
initial catalyst for the formation of an international legal order. From that per-
spective the Convention on the one hand sanctions and accelerates a process of
progressive extension of the jurisdictional rights of coastal nations over maritime
spaces. 2 Particularly significant in that respect is the recognition of an Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ)3 and the attribution to archipelagic states of sovereignty
over waters enclosed by the archipelagic baseline, their bed and subsoil, and the
resources contained therein, as well as the airspace over them.4 In addition, the
regime of the continental shelf is expanded over the entire continental margin and
in some instances beyond. 5
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1. HuGo GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (1609). A modern edition was published by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (1916). For the background and analysis of Grotius' thesis, see S.
RIESENFELD, PROTECTION OF COASTAL FISHERIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-21 (1942).
2. While the doctrine of territorial waters crystallized as a result of VAN BYNKERSHOEK, DE DoNIINIO
MARiS DISSERTATION (1702), republished by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1923), the
further dismemberment of the oceans occurred in successive steps during the twentieth century. as is traced
with great precision by Judge Oda in his dissenting opinion in Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 4, 157-71 (Judgment of Feb. 24). Judge Oda characterizes this process as an effort
to replace the longstanding concept of the freedom of the seas with a new vision of the ocean. Id at 171.
For a less appealing view see GRAF VITZTHUM, DIE PLUINDERUN. DER MEERE (1982) (a collection of
essays by fourteen German authors).
3. Cf Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122 (1982), pt. V [hereinafter cited as Conventionl, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
4. Cf id arts. 46-54.
5. See id art. 76.
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Conversely, the exploitation of seabed and ocean floor resources which are
found beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is likewise no longer left to the
freedom of any member of the international community, but instead it is com-
pletely regimented and placed under the governance of an international
authority. 6
Thus the glorious "freedom of the high seas" has been severely restricted by
juridical encroachment. Article 87 of the Draft Convention makes this abun-
dantly clear. The "freedom of the high seas" may be exercised only "under the
conditions laid down by this Convention." 7 Of the six enumerated aspects of the
freedom (called "freedoms"), solely navigation and overflight are not further qual-
ified by specific references to other parts of the Convention." Moreover, "these
freedoms" must be exercised with regard for the rights of others to engage in activ-
ities in the "Area." 9 Clearly, therefore, under the Convention the freedom of the
seas no longer includes-if it ever did include-the freedom to exploit the seabed
beneath the high seas. In the EEZ the freedoms of the high seas are even further
limited and attenuated. While the freedoms in Article 87 are at least inter a/ia
freedoms,10 the high sea freedoms exercisable within the EEZ are specifically enu-
merated and, in addition, blurred as to their contours.II
Of course, this contraction and dismemberment of the freedom of the high seas
could in large measure be justified with the threatened depletion of the resources
of the sea and the dangers to a peaceful coexistence between developed and devel-
oping members of the international community created by an untrammelled and
possibly abusive exercise of uses recognized or claimed as being within the freedom
of the sea. 12 But can this result be accomplished without the assent, and over the
formal objection, of one or more significantly affected members of the interna-
tional community?
That question necessitates inquiries into very fundamental aspects of the
freedom of the sea. If the principle of the freedom of the sea or some ramification
6. See i. pt. X1.
7. Article 87 specifies: "Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this
Convention and by other rules of international law." Id art. 87. The reference to "other rules of interna-
tional law" merely clarifies that existing limitations that might not have found their way into the Conven-
tion are not abrogated thereby and that the Convention does not close the door to new restraints developed
by customary international law.
8. See Convention, supra note 3, art. 87(l)(c)-(f).
9. Id art. 87(2).
10. Article 87(1) of the Convention, by using the qualification iter alia. follows the example of its
predecessor (article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 13 U.S.T. 2312. T.I.A.S. No. 5200.
450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as 1958 Geneva High Seas Convention]) and indicates that the enumer-
ation of the six freedoms is not to be viewed as limitative. Unlike its predecessor, however. article 87(2)
omits the references to "others" (i.e., freedoms) which are recognized by the general principles of interna-
tional law. Compare Convention, supra note 3, art. 87(l) with 1958 Geneva High Seas Convention. supra,
art. 2.
11. See Convention, supra note 3, arts. 55-56, 58-59. For a severe criticism of the regime created by
part V, see Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 4, 157-71 (Judgment of
Feb. 24) (Oda, J., dissenting).
12. Accord Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 4, 157-71 (Judgment of
Feb. 24) (Oda, J., dissenting).
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thereof has the status of a rule ofjus cogen, 13 it cannot be modified by a treaty
unless the treaty amounts to a "subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character,"' 14 a status which the Convention could not attain
without being "recognized by the international community of States as a whole."' 5
If, however, deep sea mining cannot qualify as a true exercise of the freedom of the
high seas, or if the idea of the common heritage of man is accepted not merely as
an aspirational norm but as a rule ofjus cogens, 1" a nonparty's right to pursue its
own course of action, either unilaterally or by way of an alternative regime, would
of course.have to be viewed under a different perspective. 7
The question whether deep sea mining constitutes a true exercise of the
freedom of the seas or merely-apart from other rules of customary law -a lawful
activity "not inconsistent with" the principle of the freedom of the sea is not
clearly settled. Theodore Kronmiller apparently maintains that deep sea mining is
included in and protected by the principle of the freedom of the seas,t' and Judge
Oda seems to support the same conclusion.' 9 According to others, however, there
is no unitary principle covering the resources of the sea and those of the seabed. '"
13. Which rules of customary international law have the status ofj os cogens is a much debated ques-
tion. Despite the uncertainty regarding the catalog of peremptory nornis of general international law.
however, their existence is recognized in articles 53 and 64 of the Draft Articles on the Law ofiTreaiesa.5s
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 53, 64, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/ II, at 296-97 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Convention on the Law of TreatiesJ. jee also Report of the International Law Coinis-
sion on the work of its thirty-fourth session. 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 173, U.N. Doc. A/37/10
(1982) (the third report on state responsibility before the Commission contains proposed article - which
recognizes the existence of peremptory norns of inernational law). Since the genesis of the concept iltlhc
freedom of the sea, it has been classified asjus cogens, S e Verdross. /'Lrbzd,-n Taio',s in In/erniona/La,'. 31
A.\ J. INT'L L. 571. 572 (1943); see a/in Mosler. /us (treni m I /,er~echt, 25 S(t\imFti/. J..tRt_'Ii IL- INA.
Ri-ctir. 9, 18. 19, 26, 27. 35, 37 (1968) (detailed discussion of the status of the freedom of the seas prin-
ciple). As Judge Mosler points out, an agreement between nations to curtail the rights of'outsiders iloitg
front the principle of the freedom of the sea violatesjus cogeni and is not effective even inlet pae's. On that
premise, the second sentence of article 137(1) of lthe Convention is clearls inv alid as contravening a rule of'
j}u cogens. S"e Convention. supra note 3, art. 137(l).
14. Convention on the Law of Treaties. supra note 13. art. 53.
15. Id
16. About the conflict on the normative status of the "'coninon heritage of ntankind" principle,.s'e
Schwebe, Confronlatwn, Consensus and Codifialton in Internaoiona/ Lai,'. PRx:EEIN(S ANDt COIMI--ii .
REPRt)TS tOF "rFE AMERICAN BRANCI 0i THE INT ERNAItONAi, LA\V ASSotIA'IIN, 1979-1980, at 14
(1981). The distinction between "aspirational" and "concrete" nornis \sas much discussed in the constio-
tional doctrine during the Weimar Republic. See G. ANSc:ttt'iTz, DIE VRFASSUN(; S DiL I it, :1.N
RI't(:itS 514 (14th ed 1933): H. HELRi, A.z.(i..ENt NE'S St s-stASRECtT 272 (1949): C. Schnim. l, (,tul-
diechte and Gnundpflihlen des deutschen Vo/oes. in 2 HANDBiCI DS DL t'SCI1N STAA iSR1;CAI TS 572. 597-98.
604 (1932).
17. Even if the "common heritage of mankind" principle were accepted as a fulls operational rule of
ju" cogens character, it would not follow that the parties to the Convention could dispose of ihe resources
constituting the common heritage via an international authority without the assent to such a disposal by
all nations sharing in that heritage.
18. T. KRONMILL1.R, TlE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABiED Nt'INING (1980). -IC concludes, "'deep
seabed mining is clearly within the principle of the freedom of the seas and is consistent with rules of
customary international law and relevant conventional las\.- Id at 521. He does, however, disregard the
difference between activities permissible under international law and activities guaranteed by international
law.
19. See Continental Shelf (Ttnisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya). 1982 1.C.J. 4, 157-78 (,judgment of
Feb. 24) (Oda.J.. dissenting), where it is argued that "exploitation of submarine resources being conduclted
on the high seas 1comesj under the head ofue of the sea." To the same effect, see Oda, In/entuaolnal 1,a;1 o/
Mke Resources of'the Seai. 127 RiCUiL't. DE-S COUtRs 355, 471 (1969).
20. See. e.g.. Lauterpachit, Somsregnl) oe? Yubinane Areas. 27 BRIT. Y.B.Ix-tl, L. 376, 431 (1950).
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If the latter analysis were correct, it would follow that a subsequent rule of
customary international law could restrict deep sea mining even without attaining
the status ofjus cogens. In other words, under that analysis the right to exploit the
deep seabed resources would be more vulnerable to changes in customary law.
The preceding portion of my remarks has focused on the fundamental issue of
whether and with what degree of permanence a nation outside the Convention
may claim a legal right to exploit the resources of the deep seabed, and, conversely,
whether the Convention parties have a recognized legal right to exclude nonpar-
ties from such exploitation without permit by the Authority. Regrettably, these
uncertainties and the lack of universal acceptance have heightened the dangers of
confrontation and deepened the rift between the camps, despite ten years of
negotiations.
III
THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE CONVENTION CODIFIES GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Similarly, the lack of universal acceptance of the Convention might weaken the
stability of other rules agreed upon in the Convention which, at least by many
states, had been considered as customary international law, in particular: (1) the
right to the passage of warships through the territorial waters of other nations
without prior authorization; 21 (2) the unsuspendable right to unimpeded transit
passage of war vessels through international straits in their normal mode of
transit; 22 and (3) the limitation of the breadth of the territorial sea to twelve
miles. 23
Of course, among the parties to the Convention these rights and corresponding
obligations attain the status of conventional rules subject to change only with the
agreement of the affected parties. Nations, however, that have not become parties
to the Convention or have withdrawn therefrom have no rights or duties under the
Convention itself and must rely on international law independent of the Conven-
tion. It must therefore be determined which portions of the Convention merely
codify general international law either as it preexisted or as it emerged during the
negotiations. As is well known, this issue bristles with uncertainties and has pro-
duced many scholarly analyses and judicial comments.2 4
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases the International Court of Justice con-
cluded that the legal status of the continental shelf had become customary interna-
tional law already prior to the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea
but that certain incidents such as the delimitation rules did not bind nonparty
21. See Convention, supra note 3, art. 17.
22. See id. art. 39(c).
23. See id art. 3.
24. See, e.g., Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECU,-IL DES CO.Rs 25 (1970): Meijcrs. Hoir't hInerna-
tional Law Made?- -The Stages of Growth of Internatonal Law and the Use oftis Customary Rules. 9 Ni. Y B.
INT'L L. 3 (1978); Oliver, The Rule of Law at Sea-Uncustomary Iniernational Law (unpublished manu-
script presented at A.B.A. 1982 Annual Meeting).
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states.2 5 Similarly, in the Continental Shelf Case between Tunisia and the Lybian
Arab Jamahiriya, the court found that "the concept of the exclusive economic zone
may be regarded as part of modern international law."' 26 Judge Oda, in a lengthy
dissent largely devoted to the interrelation between the continental shelf and the
EEZ, came to the same conclusion.2 7 Judge Oda posed the question,'to what
extent have the rules of the Draft Convention "embodied or crystallizedpre-exi'stent
or emergent rules of customary law." '28 He conceded expressly that "even before the
draft of a multilateral treaty becomes effective and binding . . . some of its provi-
sions will have become customary international law through repeated practice by
the states concerned." 29 He stated:
In this connection certain provisions ... which have been inherited from the provisions of
the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea may of course be regarded as already repre-
senting customary international law. In addition, what has been formulated with almost
worldwide cooperation throughout the decade may contribute to the development of cus-
tomary international law quite apart from the entry into force of the draft as treaty law. t
°
Yet Judge Oda viewed the accomplishment of UNCLOS III as "cobbling together a
patchwork of ideas which are not necessarily harmoni'ous,"' 31 he criticized in detail the
regime of the EEZ worked out by the negotiations, denying specifically that the
draft regime for the EEZ-as distinguished from the concept-had become cus-
tomary international law which could be invoked by or against other nations.3-
But even to the extent that certain regimes defined by the Convention may be
viewed as representing binding customary international law, especially those men-
tioned before, their permanency is not assured. Customary international law other
thanjus cogens emerges by consuetudo and vanishes by desuetudo. :" Hence limitations
on the jurisdiction of other nations over maritime spaces may be eroded or main-
tained only by confrontation.
IV
CONCLUSION
While I consider the product of the negotiations a huge step towards the crea-
tion of a viable system, I must conclude that without general acceptance it will
remain an imposing arch without a keystone. Yet, the position of the outsiders
likewise lacks an enduring foundation. I hope that a spirit of cooperation will
permit adjustments that enable the community of nations to set the keystone in
place. Otherwise an unstable and polarized system will emerge not unlike that of
the League of Nations.
25. North Sea Continental Shelf (Denmark v. W. Ger.), 1968 I.C.J. 3 (Order of Mar. 1).
26. Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 4, 74 (Judgment of Feb. 24).
27. Id at 157, 230.
28. Id at 170.
29. Id
30. Id
31. Id at 231.
32. Id at 171.
33. With respect to obsolescence as a ground for treaty lapse, see Arbitration on the )elimitation of
the Continental Shelf (United Kingdom v. France), Report to Parliament. March 1979. para. 47.
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